On the Dialectic of Closing and Opening in Samuel Beckett's End-game'
In his critique of discursive totalization, Jacques Derrida has defined the concept of "closure" with respect to two poles: finitude and play. His exposition of Levi-Strauss points up two possibilities for "conceiving the limit of totalization"2: against the "classical" insight into the limitation of a finite discourse, which strives in vain to master an infinite richness, Derrida sets the "modern" understanding which no longer anchors the impossibility of totalization in the concept of finitude, but rather in that of play. Within language's field of play totalization would be meaningless since the closure of a finite whole that lacks either a center or an origin allows for infinite substitutions.3
Applied to another context, this analysis can be taken to interpret the inner dynamic of Samuel Beckett's Endgame. Conversely, however, it is also possible to develop a reading of Endgame which challenges Derrida's theory of closure from a new perspective. Closure is in two ways central in Endgame: as an interpretive gesture, it forms both an implicit theme and a nucleus for the strategies guiding aesthetic response.
Endgame is commonly ascribed to the theater of the absurd. This categorization has tended to determine the nature of interpretation by suggesting an understanding of the play as a symbolic representation of 1. This article takes up arguments fundamental to my book, Samuel Becketts Endspiel mit der Subjektivitdt. Entwurf einer Wirkungsisthetik des modernen Theaters (Stuttgart: 1981) .
2. See Jacques Derrida, "La Structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines," in L'Ecriture et la difference (Paris: Seuil, 1967) , 409-28, [4231. English translation in The Structuralist Controversy, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972) , 247-65 [2601 . 3. Ibid., 423 [Trans., 2601 an absurd world. Thus we have been brought to see its characters as reduced subjects living in an alienated world of decay and awaiting death or an apocalypse with sick bodies and black humor. As a consequence, both the particularity and the peculiarity of the aesthetic presentation disappear from view and, accordingly, the crucial aesthetic experience as well: interpretation functions as closure. The "absurd"
becomes an ethnocentric category of remainders capable of accounting for everything which eludes either the familiar or the already understood.
What is it, then, in Endgame which seems so absurd? First impressions actually generate the suggestive fascination of an alien or exotic world. In a gloomy room, suffused with grey light, we meet the two main characters: Hamm in his wheelchair and Clov acting out a strange pantomime by trying to climb a ladder in order to look out the window.
But why are the windows in this barren room so high? Did a taller race of men live here once? Or have the characters been shrinking? A picture also hangs in the room, but it is turned towards the wall. Does it symbolize the "world upside-down?" In front we see two dustbins in which
Hamm's parents, Nagg and Nell, vegetate. Is this more than a wicked metaphor for the generation gap?
The characters' most striking attribute is their advanced state of bodily deteriorization. Clov is the only one who is still able to move, albeit with stiff knees. Nagg and Nell lost their legs in the famous bicycle accident in the Ardennes. Hamm is lame, blind, and bleeding, needs tranquilizers, and suffers from a chronic cough. All this is so highly suggestive of symbolic meaning that one can hardly evade the atmosphere of finality, decay, and apocalypse. The characters themselves suggest that they might be the last survivors of a great disaster, and the lifelessness of the world outside supports this view. Nothing seems more evident than to see this scene as anticipating the advancing decay of our culture or an imminent global catastrophe.
Yet these interpretive closures lead us directly into the communicative dilemma in which Endgame quite openly and intentionally wants us to be. Those who limit themselves to such a reading miss the peculiar quality of the play which presents aesthetic strategies aimed at forestalling that gesture of closure which would construe the play as the symbolic representation of a deteriorating world. Whereas Samuel Beckett's own verdict, "Beware of symbols!" is more than just a rhetorical warning against interpretive closures, the play's very atmosphere, its sensual imagery, and its mutilated plot lend themselves to such symbolic interpretations. What we find, in fact, is that the very invitation to "misreadings" is one of the main communicative strategies. out of the accumulation of discrete moments, a new quality that one might call life, resembles the spectator who attempts to compile an "identity" for the characters out of ever new sequential repetitions and recursive speech. The audience might well take Hamm's grain paradigm as a hint that neither the identity of the characters nor the meaning of the play can be discovered by assembling fragments of identity or meaning. Perhaps, then, the audience could give up its search for neatly circumscribed wholes and instead, try to illuminate the iridescent plasticity of characters and play. This would also mean abandoning an interpretative gesture of closure in order to become involved in a decentering language-game of endless substitutions, that is, a game in which fragmented units of speech appear to be randomly substituted fo each other. The play's language-game with the audience is reflected and mediated by the equally unfamiliar language-game of the characters.
The latter contradicts not only all the expectations of dramatic dialogue, but also the very conditions for the functioning of dialogue.
Neither is the dialogue situated in any intelligible context, nor does it derive from any representative function of speech or even a minimal amount of coherence. Moreover, it is full of contingencies, and these would be a stumbling block for any successful communication-at least according to systems theory.
Considering these disturbing qualities, one may be struck nonetheless by the easy flow of the dialogue. Most striking is the constant introduction of new topics, accompanied by the recurrence of nearly identical sequences of dialogue, though sometimes with the roles of the speakers reversed. The characters seem to be involved in a languagegame, in which speech units can be moved around like chess pieces.
There are not only identical but also unexpectedly abrupt moves in a game which functions according to rules unknown to the audience. An endless substitution of basic existential or anthropological problems seems to control the subject of conversation. The game, as it progresses with its preordained repetition of speech units, allows these themes to circle back on themselves. The content freezes into paradigmatic formulas belonging to an empty speech which the characters toss to and fro between them like a ball. One might think of it as a private use of language, which no longer requires one to mean what one says, but which gives one the freedom to play with the familiarity of old and empty rules. Or, from the perspective of the Derridean theory of closure:
Hamm and Clov play with the superabundance of floating signifiers over and above all their possible signifieds in order to thematize the character of this surplus itself.
Yet this language game is also an end-game which focuses on ending and non-ending. Clov knows how to gain the advantage by threatening to violate the rules and terminate what is in principle an endless game. Or does even the threat of breaking the rules belong to the game?
The nature of playing this game makes it impossible to identify the characters with their speech. By alternately exchanging slightly varied sequences of stereotyped dialogue in this game of substitution, the characters undermine any conceivable self-differentiation through their speech. So, for example, Clov's question, "Why this farce, day after day?" has already been asked before by Nell; Hamm's "Don't we laugh?" will in turn be taken up later by CloV.7 Such a play with the substitution and repetition of speech units undercuts any notion of speech as reliable self-presentation.
To aggravate matters, the characters continually vacillate between different levels of play. Thus the boundaries between the "endgame" And yet, understanding that not even specific offers of connotation refer to a hidden meaning already presupposes an involvement in the play. Where closure is continually forestalled and connotations fail to provide meaning, the audience will be excluded from its familiar relation to language.
The different strategies enticing the audience into closures which are subsequently rejected and reopened by the play lead to one significant effect: they challenge language's "structure of double meaning.""
Endgame plays with the "superabundance of signifier, in relation to the signifieds"12 in order, finally, to exaggerate altogether the line'3 between signifier and signified. This structure of double meaning is, of course, fundamental to language in general. Its effect is revealed as soon as a manifest meaning explicitly refers to a latent one. Yet, if a play such as Endgame no longer carries an evident manifest meaning, then we automatically suspect a latent one. While this suspicion can be said to characterize our reaction to poetic language in general, the challenge of What I mean here is that significance is produced by dramatic speech but can no longer be bound to its meaning. It even tends towards an asemantic quality. Only when we forego our "need for semantic suc- One main consequence of those strategies guiding audience response is that in the process of reception they shift our attention from the subjectivity of the fictional characters to our own subjectivity. What we then experience is our own decenteredness. Since the structure of double meaning is the linguistic basis of decentered subjectivity, it is entirely appropriate that the play challenge this structure. The double meaning structure, i.e., a form of expression that can simultaneously show and hide meaning, gives us a chance not only to express, but also to react to, decentered subjectivity. Equally appropriate is the peculiar presentation of characters in Endgame. Decentered subjectivity is not conveyed by presenting "decentered characters," but by challenging all familiar notions of subjectivity. To effect this challenge one cannot present so-called "realistic" characters, but only highly stylized ones. What is common to all of these interpretations is the desire to reduce the condensed form of the characters to a latent meaning. The symbolic connotations are, of course, the indisputable guides for a spontaneous response to the play. They ground the strategy of invitation to closure. The continual openings, however, prove those symbols to be irreducible. They resist any reduction to a latent meaning. Peter Brook characterizes Beckett's peculiar way of using symbols: "A true symbol is like Beckett's Endgame. The entire work is one symbol enclosing numerous others, though none of them are of the type which stand for something else; we get no further when we ask what they are supposed to mean, since here a symbol has become an object."''5
The condensation of characters constitutes still another device 16. The complexity of this double strategy has to be somewhat simplified here. For a more detailed analysis see G. Schwab, op. cit., decentering affects the audience. The relative security of our status as audience allows us to be drawn into the game Beckett's characters are playing. But in so doing, we become temporarily infected by their decentered condition. Hamm and Clov play their identity games above all with the audience's identity, making it experience both its own decenteredness and its need for centering interpretations and closures.
The strongest impulse for the reflective side of the aesthetic experience of Endgame comes from the strategy of continual opening by means of rejection and frustration. However fascinating these openings may unconsciously be, they must nonetheless be coped with consciously, for they are responsible for the continual failure of our attempts at interpretation. The history of Beckett criticism proves how difficult such an experience is even in terms of aesthetics. Thus it could also be viewed as the history of a collective defense against this failure, which in turn has given rise to a Beckett industry virtually addicted to symbolic interpretation.
Coping positively rather than negatively with the continual rejec- which is both a mastery of the frustrated spontaneous response as well as an insight into one's own acts in interpretation. In addition to the emotive and unconscious effects on the audience, self-reflection, then, can also be considered one of the basic elements in the overall response to Endgame.
I would now like to summarize some of the main points concerning the strategies guiding aesthetic response. As we have seen, the dynamic between closures and openings in Endgame entangles the audience both in the game the characters are playing and in a network made up of its own projections of meaning. This dynamic, however, is only one of the dis-illusioning strategies, which aim at a type of meta-understanding or, better yet, metaexperience of one's own communicative acts. The effect is to make the audience conscious of how it projects meaning. This allows it to experience its projections as an attempt to close and center something inherently open and decentered. We might also call this effort a defense against the experience of otherness. At the same time the dis-illusioning strategies aim at altering our need for centering and closing open structures.
The subtlest and most far-reaching of these strategies is the "withdrawal of double meaning, " i.e., the play's insistence on rejecting latent meaning, which interestingly enough itself operates as a double strategy. The separation of conscious from unconscious appeals accounts for the fact that the spectators themselves are decentered subjects. The importance of this double strategy lies in allowing them to transgress the border between consciousness and the unconscious. As our decentered subjectivity depends on polarizing these domains, transgressing the boundaries between them also affects our decentered condition.
Seen in this way, Fin de partie-the Endgame-becomes a game involving the limits of our own subjectivity. In the reception process, the conventions characterizing our subjectivity are temporarily suspended.
It is little wonder that so many react to the play as if a taboo were being violated.
Ambivalence, then, is also an important aspect of the aesthetic experience of Endgame. Transgressing the line between consciousness and the unconscious is always fraught with ambivalence. It releases anxieties of disintegration, emptiness, or inundation by the unconscious. Simultaneously, however, it can become a source of delight. We derive pleasure from our positive investment in that original, undifferentiated mode of being which has been forced by the reality principle to survive in the reserves set aside for alternative states of consciousness.
This transgressive quality of Endgame is perhaps best documented by the isolated laughter so typical during the performance of Beckett's plays. I see this laughter as an expression of unconscious understanding or reaction. The spectator signals by his laughter that the strangeness of Endgame is not so foreign to him after all. This laughter arises spontaneously at the threshold of an unconscious understanding of something which our consciousness does not allow to be understood. However impenetrable or uninterpretable the dramatic action may seem, the laughter indicates that there is indeed a hidden understanding beyond consciousness. This laughter itself subverts the boundaries of our subjectivity in a specific way, since it involves, like laughter in general, a temporary abandoning of our ego-limits. And this is, of course, precisely one of the effects which Endgame had set as its goal.
The seemingly insignificant spontaneous laughter physically anticipates a type of transgression which has become one of the hallmarks of aesthetic response to contemporary art. The conscious experience of a shift in, or an expansion of, the limits of our subjectivity is more painful and has provoked extremely defensive responses towards modern art. Endgame makes us aware that not only the open rejection of a work of art but also its "centering" by interpretive closures can be such a defense. In order to be able to derive benefit from the play's potential transgressions, we must learn to renounce interpretive closures. Endgame challenges them in three ways: it rejects them, it activates our unconscious desire for dissolutions, and it counterbalances its own transgressive tendencies by making us shift to a metalevel. Thus it aim at expanding the boundaries of our consciousness in two directions:
towards the unconscious and towards self-reflection. Simultaneously, however, our need for closure emerges, in the aesthetic experience of Endgame, as a function of our need for meaning. One historical function of Beckett's strategy guiding aesthetic response resides in the objective not simply to supplant this need with another, but instead to work on it and, in so doing, to activate our latent desire for openings. By its dialectical rendering of closure, Endgame marks a historically significant threshold beyond which we experience an important change in our dispositions and in the nature of our aesthetic response. Hence, this is really the main reason Endgame has become so successful as an "endgame" which plays with the limits of our subjectivity.
Translated by D. L. Selden
